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Abstract
We investigate the innovation rate under the im-
pact of business cycles to understand R&D activ-
ities and to derive implications for public policies.
Combining price competition and endogenous mar-
ket structure with the framework of dynamic game,
we study the Markov perfect equilibrium where het-
erogeneous ﬁrms choose whether to participate in
the innovation race and the innovation rate. Based
on the analytical results derived from the price com-
petition, we ﬁnd that increased income per capita
tends to improve aggregate innovation, while in-
cumbents reduce their innovation eﬀorts as more
entrants enter the innovation race, the competition
pressure increases. Income inequality shocks may
reduce or have no impact on innovation, depending
on equilibrium region. We ﬁnd subsidies to reduce
innovation incentive, and policies such as tax incen-
tives that reduce the variable R&D costs to have
consistently positive eﬀects. Our ﬁndings on both
the income shocks and policies are consistent with
the empirical evidences.
1. Introduction
In an economic downturn, the distortion in the
consumer demand caused by the income shifts dis-
courages the expansion and renewal of the supply
chain operations. As many ﬁrms struggle to adjust
their business processes and cut costs to adapt to
the shrunken market demand, survival becomes the
imminent concern, which may dissolve the incen-
tives to continually reinventing more agile infras-
tructures for long-term success. This adverse eﬀect
propagates throughout the industry and results in
an economy-wide stagnation and reduction of ﬁrms’
investment in innovation.
These issues of a recession heighten the aware-
ness for innovation. The lack of integration among
the entities along the supply chains calls for higher
level regulatory initiatives. In responding to the
current economic meltdown, the Obama adminis-
tration has allocated large sums of funding for the
development of science and engineering to stimu-
late innovation eﬀorts [10]. $22.5 billion dollars are
distributed among the major research agencies in-
cluding the National Science Foundation (NSF), the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), etc. [14]. In the
meantime, the Obama administration is attempting
to make the R&D tax credit permanent to increase
the incentive for innovation by businesses [21]. The
similar phenomena are observed around the globe
- governments of China, United Kingdom, Russia,
Australia, etc. are also providing generous amounts
of funding support for the R&D sectors [15] [20].
In order to evaluate the impact of these research
stimuli, it is critical to understand the implications
of diﬀerent innovation policies. In this paper, us-
ing a dynamic game framework we analyze innova-
tors’ equilibrium decisions and R&D eﬀorts facing
economic shocks, and explore the impact of pub-
lic policies on R&D through reducing innovators’
sunk costs and variable costs. Our ﬁndings provide
theoretical explanations for ﬁrms’ R&D activities
through business cycles, when ﬁrms make their de-
cisions facing future uncertainties. We also show
strong theoretical support for the empirical evidence
on innovation policies in the forms of government
subsidies and tax incentives.
By emphasizing the demand-driven innovations,
our model characterizes one of the key elements,
consumer demand, that is driving the value chains.
Speciﬁcally, we answer the questions of how diﬀer-
ent income shifts (income inequality and income per
capita) impact the innovation eﬀorts. Moreover, the
innovator heterogeneity allows us to derive insights
on why some ﬁrms, such as Apple, Google, Dell,
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etc., successfully continue the initiatives in innovat-
ing their information services and reinventing their
business models, while others come to a halt in a
fragile economy. For example, Apple retained its
enormous sales growth, Dell produced ﬂows of new
designs and products, and Google further pushed its
Cloud-based online software suites, which are essen-
tial for the digital supply chains.
On innovation activities within ﬂuctuating busi-
ness cycles, one argument states that under unfavor-
able economic climates ﬁrms cut back on R&D in
order to focus on their core business and that mo-
tivating continued innovation eﬀorts is crucial for
reviving the economy [16]; However, others argue
that it is exactly the recession that provides the
strongest driving force for ﬁrms to explore drasti-
cally new ideas for a chance to survive and thrive.
In the research front, empirical studies has shown
strong support for the procyclicality of R&D activ-
ities [3], while other recent work demonstrates that
recession should foster innovation [2] [5].
Barlevy examined the ineﬃcient procyclical allo-
cation of innovation within business cycles, and an-
alyzed the problem based on the externality of R&D
that beneﬁts ﬁrms aside from the innovator [3]; Tak-
ing a diﬀerent angle, we look at the heterogeneity
in innovators’ variable costs. As Schumpeter stated,
“[proﬁt] is the premium which capitalism attaches
to innovation” [17], entrepreneurs enters the R&D
race based on their evaluation of future market prof-
itability with the potential costs, which are condi-
tional on their capital, resources, and capability. We
model the impact of business cycles as exogenous
income shocks that shift the market demand; In
a recession, consumers have lower disposal income
and have less desire to purchase the higher quality
products. Our results show that more eﬃcient (low
variable R&D cost) ﬁrms innovate more in a reces-
sion due to dampened competition as less eﬃcient
(high variable R&D cost) ﬁrms perceive lower fu-
ture proﬁts and exit the innovation race. When less
eﬃcient ﬁrms innovate in the boom, the eﬃcient
ﬁrms innovate at a lower intensity in equilibrium,
because intensiﬁed competition reduces innovation.
However, in the latter case the aggregate innovation
rate is higher since both types of ﬁrms are innovat-
ing, which is consistent with the empirical evidence
in the literature and reconciles the conﬂicting view
points on innovation activities in a downturn.
Based on the analytical results, we demon-
strated several numerical examples and derived in-
sights for innovation policies. By varying the R&D
ﬁxed cost, we found that subsidies that directly
lower this cost may not stimulate innovation, be-
cause it reduces innovating ﬁrms’ incentive to oﬀ-
set the sunk cost while maximizing proﬁts; in other
words, ﬁrms become “lazier.” However, at a very
large ﬁxed cost, the industry only has eﬃcient ﬁrms
innovating, where the aggregate innovation rate is
lower than in an industry where all ﬁrms choose to
innovate. The empirical literature on subsidy poli-
cies also shows this inconsistency [9]. On the other
hand, we ﬁnd that reducing variable R&D cost has a
generally favorable eﬀect and encourages both types
of ﬁrms to innovate at a higher rate. Various R&D
tax incentives, such as tax credits, are examples of
policies that directly aﬀect the R&D variable cost.
Our ﬁnding is supported by wide empirical evidence
on positive impact of tax incentives on ﬁrms’ inno-
vation eﬀorts [7] [11] [4].
This work also oﬀers theoretical contributions
to the related literature. Foellmi and Zweimuller
studied the eﬀect of income inequality on growth
using non-homothetic consumer preference [8]. In
their formulation, both the poor and rich consumer
segments either all purchase one good or not. Our
model incorporates the consumer tastes as well as
income levels, under which market segmentation oc-
curs for each income level.
We also account for the heterogeneity of com-
peting innovators at diﬀerent costs; As a result, we
are able to contrast diﬀerent types of ﬁrms as inno-
vation rate either changes smoothly or jumps with
income, and infer policy implications. Furthermore,
the explicit characterization of vertical diﬀerentia-
tion shows that the equilibrium can fall under sev-
eral cases. The ﬁndings under these cases imply
that the segmentation of consumers at various in-
come levels leads to diﬀerent results when examin-
ing how income parameters aﬀect innovation rate,
and are in sharp contrast with the ﬁndings in [8].
Studies in the industrial organization literature
have examined ﬁrm-level R&D issues. However, this
line of work has mostly focused on a static model
that limits the analysis to a single or ﬁnite period
model [12] [13], with a few exceptions such as Se-
gal and Whinston’s work on anti-trust policy and
innovation [18]. We adopt their framework with an
extension to include dynamic draws of innovators’
types in terms of their variable costs. Moreover, we
endogenize entrant’s and incumbents’ proﬁts using
a consumer income distribution and product quality
levels to include the demand factor, which is absent
from Segal and Whinston’s work. The shifting of
business cycles that is reﬂected in consumer income
change plays a major role in incentizing potential
entrants’ R&D eﬀorts, as consumers’ demands di-
rectly determines the future rewards of the innova-
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tors.
Based on Shaked and Sutton, the seminal work
on market equilibrium with vertical diﬀerentia-
tion [19], we relax the assumption of uniform in-
come distribution by generalizing the distribution,
and further reﬁne their model with a taste shock
for consumers at all income levels. The taste shock
reﬂects the heterogeneity of consumers’ preferences
toward newer technologies. This setup also lifts the
distribution restriction imposed in most analytical
work, in turn permits matching of actual data mo-
ments to ﬁnd results relevant to realistic economic
settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
We describe the price competition game and ana-
lyze the endogenous market structure in Section 2.
Then we present the innovation race and analyze
the ﬁrm’s innovation decisions in Section 3. Section
4 discusses the reaction of equilibrium innovation
rate to diﬀerent income shocks and regulatory poli-
cies. Section 5 concludes.
2. Price Competition and Market
Structure
The present paper develops a dynamic model
with price competition on diﬀerentiated products
in each period. This model connects consumers’
demand and ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀort through en-
dogenous market structure. The analysis shows the
impact of the aggregate economic conditions from
the demand side on aggregate innovation. In this
section, we describe the model setup for the static
price competition, and analyze ﬁrm’s pricing strate-
gies and market segmentation based on consumers’
preferences. In Section 3, we will analyze the ﬁrm’s
innovation behaviors.
Our framework has an inﬁnite horizon, where
each discrete period has the discount factor β ∈
(0, 1). In each period, there exists two groups of
ﬁrms diﬀering in their objectives and actions. The
incumbent ﬁrms compete in price in the product
market, into which the innovations are introduced
as the latest generation, or highest quality, good;
The potential entrants are the ﬁrms making inno-
vation decisions in the R&D race. This section for-
mulates the competition and market structure in
the product market among the incumbents. The
innovators, prior to successfully innovating and en-
tering the product market, choose whether to enter
the R&D race and, if so, the equilibrium level of
innovation eﬀort. That is presented in Section 3.
Using the dynamic programming approach, we
solve for the stationary Markov perfect equilibria
of the inﬁnite-horizon game. This section analyzes
the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
of the pricing competition game in a static vertical
diﬀerentiation model. Assuming ﬁrms do not col-
lude, the pricing strategies in the analysis here is
part of the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
of the dynamic game.
2.1. Consumers
The setup here extends Shaked and Sutton [19]
by generalizing the consumer income distribution.
A continuum of consumers are heterogeneous in
their income levels and tastes for the product. De-
note a consumer’s income by I ∈ {IH , IL} , such
that IL < IH , and  = IH − IL,; let πL ∈ [0, 1]
and πH ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of low and high
income segments respectively. πH + πL = 1. De-
ﬁne income per capita I = IHπH + IlπL, the rel-
ative high income ratio qh = IHI . Thus the triple
(I, qh, πH) characterizes the income distribution of
the economy. Furthermore, each consumer experi-
ences a taste shock denoted by the random variable
z that follows the uniform distribution: z ∼ U [z, z].
For simplicity, a consumer’s taste is ﬁxed across her
life.
In each period, consumers observe ﬁrms which
produce vertically diﬀerentiated, substitute goods
as a result of the innovation race, described in sec-
tion 3.. Denote k = 1, ..., n as an index of the qual-
ity of products, where a higher k represents a higher
quality.
The consumers are utility maximizing:
max U(I, z, k) = uk ∗ (I + z)
where uk = eak following [6] and u0 < u1 < ... < un.
Each consumer’s utility is deﬁned by the utility for
consuming a certain quality good weighted by the
consumer’s disposable income and taste. Let Ck
be the relative utility diﬀerence between products k
and k − 1, and Ck > 1:
Ck =
uk
uk − uk−1 =
ea
ea − 1 = C
.
Deﬁne zjk as the indiﬀerence taste level in the in-
come segment j, so that the consumer with taste zjk
is indiﬀerent between product k and k − 1 at their
respective prices. So for j ∈ {L,H},
U(Ij − pk, zjk, k) = U(Ij − pk−1, zjk, k − 1)
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From here, we derive
zj1 = p1C1 − Ij (1)
zjk = pk−1(1− Ck) + pkCk − Ij (2)
Then consumers within each income segment with
taste z > zjk has the preference order (k, pk) 
(k − 1, pk−1).
Proposition 1. The indiﬀerence taste levels zjk
have the following properties:
1. ∀ k, zjk > zjk−1, for j ∈ {L,H};
2. ∀ k, zHk < zLk ;
3. ∀ k, zHk + IH = zLk + IL, so zHk + = zLk .
Proposition 1 outlines the mathematical proper-
ties, which are used for the proofs and analysis of
the later analytical ﬁndings.
2.2. Market Structure Analysis
Firms’ revenue functions take diﬀerent forms de-
pending on market segmentation, which is deter-
mined by the values of the exogenous parameters
(e.g., those for income distribution and taste) and
by the equilibrium prices. For example, a ﬁrm’s rev-
enue function will not include the term describing
the low-income segment, if in equilibrium its price
does not capture any low-income consumers; and
the levels of high and low incomes as well as upper
and lower bounds for consumers’ taste impact such
segmentation in equilibrium. The revenue functions
for n ﬁrms below are listed by these cases.
For k = 1, R1(p1, p2, ..., pn), the revenue of ﬁrm
1 given the price of his product p1, is expressed in
terms of the following cases:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p1(zL2 − z)πL, zH2 ≤ z and zL2 ≥ z;
p1(zH2 − z)πH + p1(zL2 − z)πL, zL1 ≤ z and zH2 ≥ z;
p1(zH2 − z)πH + p1(zL2 − zL1 )πL, zH1 ≤ z and zL1 ≥ z;
p1(zH2 − zH1 )πH + p1(zL2 − zL1 )πL, zH1 ≥ z.
(3)
In the ﬁrst two cases, the lowest taste consumers
among the low-income segment strictly prefer pur-
chasing the low-quality product than not buying –
the low-income market is covered; In case 1, all high-
income consumers will purchase the high-quality
product, whereas in case 2, they are split between
two products. In the last two cases, some low-taste
consumers in the low-income segment would not
purchase even the low-quality product - the low-
income market is not covered; In case 3, the high-
income segment is covered, whereas in case 4, the
high-income market may not be covered.
For 1 < k < n, Rk(p1, p2, ..., pn), the revenue of
ﬁrm k given the price of his product pk, is,
⎧⎨
⎩
pk(zHk+1 − z)πH + pk(zLk+1 − zLk )πL, zHk ≤ z
pk(zHk+1 − zHk )πH + pk(zLk+1 − zLk )πL, zHk ≥ z;
(4)
And for k = n,
Rn(p1, p2, ..., pn) = pn(z − zHn )πH + pn(z − zLn )πL.
(5)
Based on the ﬁrst-order conditions, we can de-
rive the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let z < min{2Nz + (2N − 1)IL −
πHΔ, (2N−1πL + 2)z + (2N−1πL + 2N−1 − 1)IL +
πHΔ}, for any Nash equilibrium in this vertically
diﬀerentiated market, at most N ﬁrms (producing
products of qualities n, n−1, .. n− (N −1)) obtain
positive market shares.
We have derived the necessary condition for an
N-ﬁrm equilibrium in Lemma 1. To further analyze
the existence of such equilibrium, for tractability
we apply the lemma to the N=2 case and consider
a two-ﬁrm market.
Proposition 2. Let z < min{4z + 3IL −
πHΔ, (2πL+2)z+(2πL+1)IL+πHΔ}, for any Nash
equilibrium in this vertically diﬀerentiated market,
at most two ﬁrms (producing products of qualities n
and n− 1) obtain positive market shares.
2.3. Two-firm equilibrium
Deﬁne V = u2−u0u2−u1 =
C2−1
C1
+ 1, thus we have
p1 =
zj1 + Ij
C1
(6)
p2 =
zj2 + Ij + (z
j
1 + Ij)(V − 1)
C2
(7)
Referring back to Equations (3), we get the follow-
ing FOCs for ﬁrm 1, listed in the order of the cor-
responding cases:
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zL2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
z + (zL1 + IL)(V − 1)
πHΔ+ z + (zL1 + IL)(V − 1)
πH(Δ + z) + zL1 πL + (z
L
1 + IL)(V − 1 + πL)
zL1 + (z
L
1 + IL)V ;
(8)
Firm 2’s FOC is either of the following ordered
as the proﬁt functions:
zL2 =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2
[
z − IL − (zL1 + IL)(V − 1) + (z − z)πHπL
]
1
2
[
z + πHΔ− IL − (zj1 + Ij)(V − 1)
]
(9)
Figure 1 plots ﬁrm 1’s FOCs for diﬀerent ranges
of zL1 . Regions 1 through 4 in the ﬁgure correspond
to the four cases of Equation (3); and Regions 5, 6
and 7 are the regions between the adjacent cases. In
these regions, in equilibrium one ﬁrm varies its price
while the other holds its price constant. Note that
from Equations (8), ﬁrm 1’s FOCs are expressed as
functions zL2 (z
L
1 ), which is increasing, whereas from
Equations (9) ﬁrm 2’s FOCs are decreasing func-
tions. The point of intersection is the equilibrium
taste levels zL∗1 and z
L∗
2 , from which equilibrium
prices are calculated. In the lemma below, we set
conditions under which equilibrium occurs in cer-
tain regions.
Lemma 2. Assuming z+IL ≥ Δ, let (2πL+πH)z+
πLIL < z < (2πL +2)z + (2πL +1)IL + πHΔ, there
exist a unique equilibrium where exactly 2 ﬁrms will
have positive market shares. The possible regions
where the equilibrium lies include Regions 1, 2, 5
and 6. Moreover, the both low- and high-income
markets are covered (i.e., the equilibrium does not
lie in Region 3, 4 or 7).
The equilibrium region depends on the values
of the exogenous parameters. The general results
for determining equilibrium region are stated in the
following proposition.
Figure 1: Firm 1’s First Order Conditions
Proposition 3. When z ∈ [(2πL + πH)z +
πLIL, (2πL +πH)z+πLIL +3πLΔ], the equilibrium
lies in Region 1. When z ∈ [(2πL + πH)z + πLIL +
3πLΔ, 2z + IL + (3πL + πH)Δ], the equilibrium lies
in Region 5. When z ≥ 2z + IL + (3πL + πH)Δ,
if V ≥ z+z+2IL−πHΔ3(z+IL) , then the equilibrium lies in
Region 2, otherwise it lies in Region 6.
We derive the equilibrium indiﬀerence taste lev-
els, prices, and revenues in these diﬀerent regions.
This characterizes the market structure and prof-
itability given the economic conditions, in particular
the consumer income distribution within a period.
Table 1: Equilibrium Prices in Regions 1, 2, 5, and 6
Prices
p∗1 =
z−2z−IL+(z−z) πHπL
3C(V−1)
Region 1 p∗2 =
1
3C
[
2z − z + IL + 2(z − z)πHπL
]
p∗1 =
1
C(V−1) [(1 +
πH
πL
)(z − z)− z
−IL − 2Δ]
Region 5 p∗2 =
(z−z)(1+ πH
πL
)−Δ
C
p∗1 =
z−2z−πHΔ−IL
3(C−1)
Region 2 p∗2 =
2z−z+πHΔ+IL
3C
p∗1 =
z+IL
C
Region 6 p∗2 =
z+πHΔ+IL+(z+IL)(V−1)
2C
Table 2: Equilibrium Proﬁts in Regions 1, 2, 5, and 6
Profits
R∗1 =
πL
9C(V−1)
[
z − 2z − IL + (z − z)πHπL
]2
Region 1 R∗2 =
πL
9C
[
2z − z + IL + 2(z − z)πHπL
]2
R∗1 =
πLΔ
C(V−1) [(1 +
πH
πL
)(z − z)− z
−IL − 2Δ]
Region 5 R∗2 =
1
CπL
[
(1 + πH
πL
)(z − z)−Δ
]2
R∗1 =
(z−2z−πHΔ−IL)2
9(C−1)
Region 2 R∗2 =
(2z−z+πHΔ+IL)2
9C
R∗1 =
z+IL
C
[z − πHΔ− IL − 2z
−(z + IL)(V − 1)]
Region 6 R∗2 =
[z+πHΔ+IL+(z+IL)(V−1)]2
4C
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3. Innovating Firms
This section describes the innovation race and
ﬁrms’ innovation decisions. Our setup follows the
framework developed by Segal and Whinston (2007)
with the extension of heterogeneity of innovation
costs across ﬁrms [18].
There exist M ﬁrms who are potential entrants.
Every period, they pick up a draw  from a distribu-
tion F (·). This draw aﬀects the cost of innovation,
which is c(φi()) and known to ﬁrms as the draws
are realized. φi() ∈ (0, 1) is the innovation rate of
ﬁrm i with the draw . c(·) is a concave function.
Potential entrants make decisions in three
stages: 1) Entry to innovation race - ﬁrms choose
whether to innovate; 2) Innovation eﬀort - ﬁrms
choose the level of R&D, which aﬀects its prob-
ability to successfully innovate, hence the chance
of market entry; 3) In case of market entry, ﬁrms
choose their prices, which is described in the equi-
librium results in the previous section.
Multiple innovators may succeed in developing
new products. However, only one of these innova-
tions is granted a patent. The ﬁrm with a patent
then enters the product market and becomes an
incumbent with the highest quality product. We
use the simultaneous entry and exit setup, thus the
lowest-quality incumbent is displace upon a new en-
try. The innovation model connects to the market
structure analysis at this point, as the proﬁts of a
new entrant is characterized by the equilibrium re-
sults derived in Section 3.2.
If a ﬁrm chooses to innovate, it incurs a sunk
innovation cost f . Let πM (φI−) denote the prob-
ability of a ﬁrm successfully creating a new prod-
uct. φI− ∈ [0, 1]M describes the innovation eﬀorts
of all the potential entrants. However, each pe-
riod only one of these ﬁrms is granted a patent and
enters the market, the probability of actually ob-
taining the patent is then denoted by λM l(φ, φ−).
φ− ∈ [0, 1]M−1 denotes the innovation eﬀorts of the
rest of potential entrants1. The value functions of
the ﬁrms at diﬀerent stages are listed below:
V 0(, φ−) = max{0,−f + βV E(, φ−)} (10)
V E(, φ−) = maxφ{λM l(φ, φ−)V IJ
+(1− λM l(φ, φ−))βEV 0(′, φ′−)
−c(φ)} (11)
V Ii (, φ−) = πM l(φ
I
−)[Ri−1 + βV
I
i−1(, φ−)]
+(1− πM l(φI−))[Ri
+βV Ii (, φ−)] (12)
i = 2, ..., J
V I1 (, φ−) = πM l(φ−)βEV
0(′, φ′−)
+(1− πM l(φ−))[R1
+βV I1 (, φ−)] (13)
V 0(, φ−) is the value function of ﬁrms at the start
of the game; V E(, φ−) is the value function at
Stage 1; V Ii (, φ−) and V
I
1 (, φ−) are the value func-
tions for incumbents producing product quality i
and the lowest quality product before exiting, re-
spectively. It is easy to show that the dynamic pro-
gramming problem described by equations (10)-(13)
satisﬁes the Blackwell suﬃcient conditions, thus it
has a unique ﬁxed point in a bounded space.
Assuming  ∈ {l, h} follows Bernoulli distri-
bution, the probability of drawing h is η . For
simplicity, let the number of ﬁrms facing low inno-
vation shocks in each period be M l (by the Law
of Large Numbers M l ≈ (1 − η)M). Following the
formulation for multiple entrants case in Segal and
Whinston’s work [18], if both types of ﬁrms inno-
vate, the probability of at least one ﬁrm successfully
creating a innovation is,
πM l(φ
I
−) = [1− (1−φ(h))M−M
l
(1−φ(l)Ml ] (14)
If only low-cost ﬁrms innovate,
πM l(φ
I
−) = [1− (1− φ(l))M
l
] (15)
And in the former case, for any one ﬁrm, condi-
tional on successful innovation, the probabilities of
obtaining a patent for the high- and low-cost ﬁrms
are
r(φh−) =
M−Ml−1∑
x=0
Ml∑
y=0
[
(M −M l − 1
x
)(M l
y
)
(φh)
x(1− φh)M−Ml−1−x(φl)y(1− φl)Ml−y
x + y + 1
]
r(φl−) =
M−Ml∑
x=0
Ml−1∑
y=0
[
(M −M l
x
)(M l − 1
y
)
(φh)
x(1− φh)M−Ml−1−x(φl)y(1− φl)Ml−y
x + y + 1
]
The probability of obtaining a patent for this ﬁrm
with high or low cost is, respectively, then,
λM l(φ(h), φ
h
−) = φ(h)r(φ
h
−)
λM l(φ(l), φ
l
−) = φ(l)r(φ
l
−)
1φh− and φ
l
− are other ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts for a ﬁrm with high or low innovation costs respectively.
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In the latter case, the conditional probability for a
given ﬁrm is
r(φl−) =
k=Ml−1∑
k=0
[
1
k + 1
(M l − 1
k
)
φkl (1− φl)M
l−1−k
]
The equilibrium is the ﬁxed point of the following
correspondence:
φ() = argmaxφ′∈[0,1]{0,−f + V E(, φ′)}
In the following section, we discuss the numerical
solutions to the ﬁrm’s dynamic problem and derive
insight on the impacts of diﬀerent innovation poli-
cies and aggregate economic conditions on innova-
tion.
4. Equilibrium and Comparative
Statics
In this section, we will discuss the parameteriza-
tions and the comparative statics results based on
the numerical analysis. First we show the change
in equilibrium innovation rate with respect to dif-
ferent types of income shocks. And then the impli-
cations of public policies are discussed according to
the results from varying sunk and variable innova-
tion costs.
4.1. Parameterization
The aim of our analysis is to provide insight into
the qualitative properties of equilibrium innovation
rate under the eﬀect of income shocks and diﬀerent
types of innovation policies. Although some param-
eters are chosen from standard values and previous
literature, they are not based on data from some
speciﬁc industries.
The discount rate β = 0.95 implies the annual
interest rate is approximately 5%. a in the utility
function is 1.2. The income per capital I is 0.9. The
relative high income qh is 1.11. We assume half of
consumers have high income. The upper bound of
taste shock z is 4.2, while the lower bound of the
taste shock z is 1.2. The sunk cost of innovation
f is set to 5. As for the functional form of innova-
tion cost c(·), we follow Aghion, et al.’s model and
use quadratic form, c() = φ2 [1]. Firms with high
variable innovation costs have h = 20. Firms with
low variable innovation costs have l = 12. We also
assume the number of potential entrants is 10 each
period and the number of ﬁrms with high innovation
costs is 5. We set these numbers relatively small to
reduce the computation load.
With the above parameterizations, both types
of ﬁrms conduct innovation. The innovation rate
for the ﬁrms with high innovation costs is 0.4641.
The innovation eﬀort of the rest of ﬁrms is higher,
0.5964, as their innovation costs are lower. The
equilibrium prices fall in Region 2 in Section 4.2.
If we raise the lower bound of taste shock z to 2.2
and set a = 1.4, then the equilibrium falls into Re-
gion 1. The ﬁrms with high innovation cost do not
innovate. The ﬁrms with low innovation cost now
invest higher and have innovation rate 0.7729. We
discuss ﬁrms’ innovation behaviors in diﬀerent re-
gions in the following.
4.2. Innovation and Income Shock
We study two types of income shocks in this part
of the numerical analysis, income inequality and in-
come per capita. For income inequality, we hold the
per-capita income I ﬁxed and vary the income gap.
For income per capita, we hold the income inequal-
ity ﬁxed. These two experiments allow us to isolate
the eﬀect of each of the two factors.
With respect to income inequality, holding the
income per capita I and proportion of low- and
high-income segments, πh, πl ﬁxed, we vary the rel-
ative high income level qh to reﬂect the varying in-
equality. The results contrast sharply between Re-
gion 1 and Region 2 (recalling that the region where
equilibrium falls is found endogenously by the pa-
rameter values that characterize the consumer pref-
erence and income, and thus the prices set by ﬁrms).
In other words, varying income inequality within
the range of the region conditions allows us to exam-
ine innovation in industries with certain consumer
preferences and yielded notably distinct results.
Figure 2: Innovation & Income Inequality -
Region 1
In Region 1 (see Figure 2), where low-income is
segmented between two products and high-income is
solely captured by the higher quality ﬁrm, increas-
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ing inequality has an adverse eﬀect on both innovate
rate and ﬁrm values. The values of both types of
ﬁrm decline with inequality due to reduced revenue.
This may appear counterintuitive, as one would ex-
pect steeper inequality to beneﬁt the higher-quality
ﬁrm, which obtains the entire high-income segment
as well as part of the low-income segment. Our ﬁnd-
ing oﬀers the opposite explanation that with a wider
income gap higher-quality ﬁrm actually lowers its
price in equilibrium in order to reach the low-income
level while still gaining the entirety of high-income
segment. The aggregate innovation rate shows in-
signiﬁcant change until the high-variable-cost ﬁrms
drop out of the innovation race, at which point the
innovation rate declines signiﬁcantly.
Figure 3: Innovation & Income Inequality -
Region 2
Region 2’s equilibrium results are independent of
income inequality shifts when the income per capita
is held ﬁxed, due to the condition that both low-
and high-income segments are shared between two
ﬁrms. As a result, both ﬁrm values and innovation
rates are constant in income quality (see Figure 3).
This result is conﬁrmed by the equilibrium proﬁts
in Table 2 where these proﬁts are only related to I
rather than qh.
We further analyze the impact of per-capita
income on innovation while holding ﬁxed the in-
come inequality parameter qh. The results for the
two regions look similar. Increasing per-capita in-
come directly shifts the equilibrium revenues. The
value of the ﬁrms that have a low variable cost
increases ﬁrst, where the high-variable-cost ﬁrms
choose to not innovate; as the income level rises fur-
ther, the value of the low-variable-cost ﬁrms drops
and then increases in parallel with the high-variable
cost ﬁrms (see Figures 4 & 5).
Figure 4: Innovation & Income per Capita -
Region 1
Thus, the improvement in overall income levels
has three eﬀects: 1) It encourages high-variable-cost
ﬁrms to enter the R&D race; and 2) It intensiﬁes
competition and in turn shifts down low-variable-
cost ﬁrms’ innovation rate; 3) It induces higher in-
novation rate among the existing innovators. This
is linked to the increased demand and equilibrium
proﬁts in the product market where the successful
innovator enters. Even though increased competi-
tion shifts down the equilibrium innovation rate of
the low-variable-cost ﬁrms upon the entry of the
high-variable-cost ﬁrms, the aggregate innovation is
increased.
Figure 5: Innovation & Income per Capita -
Region 2
Examination of diﬀerent types of potential en-
trants reveals the underlying value gaps of the het-
erogeneous ﬁrms within the aggregate innovation
rate. The procyclicality of R&D is reaﬃrmed in
the aggregate sense. On the other hand, the argu-
ment that recession can also stimulate innovation
is reﬂected in the ﬁrst eﬀect described above. The
high-variable-cost ﬁrms drop out of the R&D com-
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petition, thus reduced competition gives a boost to
those remaining in the R&D race.
4.3. Innovation and Policy
We also look at the eﬀects of varying the vari-
able costs and sunk costs of the innovating ﬁrms.
We vary the variable costs proportionally, since the
heterogeneity resides in ﬁrms’ variable costs.
As Figure 6 shows, as the variable cost de-
creases (examining the x axis from right to left)
both the value and innovation rate increase for the
low-variable-cost ﬁrms, while the high-variable-cost
ﬁrms do not innovate. Similar to the previous obser-
vations with income per capita, further decreasing
the variable cost results in a drop of the value and
innovation rate of the low-variable-cost ﬁrms, as the
high-variable-cost ﬁrms join the R&D race.
This result has an important R&D tax policy
implication. R&D tax incentives can be designed to
lower ﬁrms’ R&D variable costs by providing more
tax cuts for more dollars spent on technology inno-
vation. In eﬀect, these policies increase ﬁrms’ prof-
its for more R&D activities. The similar three ef-
fects as those observed with the income per capita
are drawn here. And we see that reducing variable
R&D costs improves the aggregate innovation.
We also analyzed innovation rate against the in-
novation sunk cost, which refers to the ﬁxed cost to
set up an R&D facility and purchase R&D equip-
ments, which may be applicable to start-up ﬁrms
or those of small capacity. It seems counterintuitive
that increasing ﬁxed cost can encourage innovation
rate. This ﬁnding is consistent for the low-variable-
cost ﬁrms, whereas for the high-variable-cost ﬁrms
the innovation rate drops to zero when the ﬁxed cost
exceeds a certain threshold (see Figure 7).
Figure 6: Innovation & Variable Costs
Figure 7: Innovation & Fixed Costs
The partially positive eﬀect of ﬁxed cost is due
to that the ﬁrms innovate more intensely in order
to achieve a higher probability of success to oﬀset
the cost. However, above a certain threshold, the
level of ﬁxed cost no longer justiﬁes innovation deci-
sion for those with high variable costs, in which case
the high-variable-cost ﬁrms drop out of the R&D
race, while the low-variable-cost ﬁrms’ innovation
rate has an upward jump caused by the dampened
competition and continues to rise at a low rate.
In the aggregate sense, the optimal innovation is
achieved in the ﬁrst range when both types of ﬁrms
innovate (see Figure 7). The insight here is that
subsidies for innovation may not stimulate R&D ef-
forts, because the innovating ﬁrms the incentives to
compete in an attempt to recover the sunk cost are
diminished. In eﬀect, ﬁrms become “lazier” as the
proﬁtability linked with innovation eﬀort is more
easily achieved. Furthermore, when an industry has
a very high R&D sunk cost, only specialized or es-
tablished ﬁrms that can eﬃciently carry out R&D
will compete in innovation.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the change in in-
novation rate given income shocks to understand
the innovation decision of ﬁrms under the impact of
business cycles. We further analyzed the innovation
rate while varying heterogeneous innovating ﬁrms’
sunk and variable R&D costs and derived implica-
tions for innovation policies.
We found that eﬀects of income shocks diﬀer by
varying either income inequality and per-capita in-
come while holding the other ﬁxed. Under income
inequality change, the change in innovation rate has
radically diﬀerent results conditional on the equi-
librium region. In Region 1, the innovation rate
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decreases as income levels become more polarized,
because equilibrium revenues and prices are lowered
to capture the poorer low-income consumers. In Re-
gion 2, varying inequality has little eﬀect since both
low- and high-income markets are segmented.
Increasing per-capita income has similar results
in the two regions, because ﬁrms’ equilibrium prof-
its increase in both Region 1 and Region 2. Raising
the overall income levels has several eﬀects. First,
it encourages high-variable-cost ﬁrm to enter the
R&D race, because the proﬁtability of the market
is increased. However, introducing more innovating
ﬁrms intensiﬁes competition and reduces the other
ﬁrms’ equilibrium innovation rate. Thus there is a
downward shift of the low-variable-cost ﬁrms’ inno-
vation rate as more ﬁrms enter the race. Regardless,
the aggregate innovation rate increases with such a
shock.
Our policy analysis showed consistent ﬁndings
with the empirical evidence that subsidies tend to
have ambiguous eﬀects on innovation, whereas tax
incentives have strongly positive impact. We pro-
vide the explanation that subsidies often directly
compensate ﬁrms’ sunk R&D costs, thus reduce the
premium that ﬁrms aim to recover through innova-
tion success. While it moderates innovation eﬀorts,
dampened competition may have a positive eﬀect
on ﬁrms with lower variable costs. R&D tax credits
reduce ﬁrms’ variable costs; therefore, they continu-
ously stimulate innovation eﬀorts while encouraging
entry into the R&D race.
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